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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing in Australia is founded upon two premises that are in perennial 
conflict: individualized justice and consistency. The first holds that courts 
should impose sentences that are just and appropriate according to all of the 
circumstances of each particular case. The second holds that similarly situated 
offenders should receive similar sentencing outcomes. The result is an 
ambivalent jurisprudence that challenges sentencers as they attempt to meet the 
conflicting demands of each premise. 
While there is an inherent tension between the premises of individualized 
justice (“individualism”) and consistency (“comparativism”),2 they both are 
fundamental to a fair sentencing system. These paradigms are not dichotomous 
but points at the ends of a spectrum, along which a balance can be struck.3 In 
practice, sentencing judges do not act at either extreme. In Australia, the 
current balance heavily favors individualism over consistency. 
In recent decades, common law jurisdictions have developed measures to 
reduce unjustified disparity in sentencing and generally encourage consistency 
of approach or outcome in like cases. Unjustified disparity violates fundamental 
tenets of the rule of law and the right to equality, erodes public confidence in 
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 1.  With apologies to Anthony Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If 
You Don’t Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING 
REFORM 199 (C.M.V. Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
 2.  James Jacob Spigelman, Consistency and Sentencing, 82 AUSTL. L.J. 450, 450 (2008). The 
problem is an old one. See, e.g., Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing 
Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perennial Problem, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1288 (1979).  
 3.  See Arie Freiberg & Sarah Krasnostein, Statistics, Damn Statistics and Sentencing, 21 J. JUD. 
ADMIN. 73 (2011). 
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the administration of justice, and has costly resource implications. Although the 
pursuit of this aim is noncontroversial, its manifestations are not. In particular, 
there is disagreement about the nature of disparity and a paucity of evidence 
regarding its extent. More problematically, there is a lack of evidence regarding 
the effectiveness of the measures that have been introduced to eliminate it.4 
In this article, the competing paradigms of individualism and consistency are 
compared, the meanings of “consistency” and “disparity” are explored, a 
sample of the empirical evidence for unjustified disparity is identified, the 
measures adopted in Australia to encourage consistency are outlined, and the 
meager evaluative literature that attempts to assess these interventions is 
discussed. 
More and better quantitative and qualitative data are needed to understand 
the extent of unjustified disparity as well as the effectiveness of the measures 
introduced to minimize it. In Australia, ineffectiveness of the measures adopted 
to encourage consistency may not reflect a failure of the measures themselves, 
but rather a failure of the predominantly individualist framework in which they 
operate. The ambivalent attitude of courts of appeal toward the importance of 
consistency requires review in order to promote fairer sentencing outcomes.5 
II 
INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE AND CONSISTENCY 
Australia has nine sentencing jurisdictions—eight states and territories plus 
a federal system.6 Most sentencing occurs at the state level.7 The High Court of 
Australia is the highest court in the country, with appellate jurisdiction over all 
other courts. Each state and territory has its own court hierarchy, culminating in 
the appeals division of its Supreme Court. Trial divisions of the Supreme Courts 
hear major criminal matters, mostly murders and some serious drug cases. Most 
jurisdictions have two levels of inferior courts: County or District Courts hear 
the majority of serious criminal matters (with juries), and Magistrates’ or Local 
Courts hear less serious criminal matters (without juries). 
The basic framework is that federal, state, and territory criminal legislation 
creates offenses and prescribes maximum penalties. Criminal statutes 
sometimes provide guidance regarding the use of certain sanctions by listing, 
 
 4.  A problem shared, to varying extents, with comparable jurisdictions. See, e.g., Rodney Engen, 
Racial Disparity in the Wake of Booker/Fanfan: Making Sense of “Messy” Results and Other Challenges 
for Sentencing Research, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1139 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult to 
comment on the impact of sentencing guidelines on sentencing disparity [in the United States] because 
there simply is little empirically rigorous research examining the effects of actual policy changes . . . for 
sentencing practices.”). 
 5.  See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 195–96 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 
1996).  
 6.  Different state and federal laws can themselves produce inconsistent outcomes. See AUSTL. 
LAW REFORM COMM’N, ALRC REPORT 103: SAME CRIME, SAME TIME: SENTENCING OF FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS 119 (2006). 
 7.  Arie Freiberg, Australia: Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 204, 204 (2010). 
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without ranking, sentencing purposes and aggravating and mitigating factors, 
which judges may be required to consider or which may be merely advisory.8 
Within this statutory structure, judicial discretion is regulated by the common 
law as developed by appellate courts. 
The tension between individualized justice and consistency is reflected in 
the potential difference between a sentence based on the circumstances of an 
individual case and one based on comparison with similar cases.9 The sentencing 
discourse regarding the relationship between individualized justice and 
consistency is mediated through the concept of judicial discretion, which is 
regarded as a crucial component of fair sentencing because it enables abstract 
legal rules to be applied to real-life offenses. The orthodox view holds that a 
“broad”10 judicial discretion to choose between sentencing purposes and options 
is “vital,”11 because it alone safeguards individualized justice by freeing judges 
to tailor sentences to the “wide variations of circumstances of the offence and 
the offender”12 that are “unique”13 to each case.14 On this understanding, broad 
judicial discretion, individualized justice, and fair sentencing outcomes are 
directly related. There is a deep “cultural resistance to modification of judicial 
discretion within the judiciary and the legal profession generally,” a concept 
that is sometimes couched in terms of judicial independence.15 This “strong” 
view of individualized justice is frequently conflated with the notion of fair 
sentencing.16 
A.  The Individualist Approach 
The individualist approach is underpinned by certain widely repeated and 
strongly held propositions:17 
 Because the discretion entrusted to sentencing judges is of “vital importance”18 in 
the administration of criminal justice, it is required19 that this discretion be “very 
 
 8.  Id. We omit from the following discussion sentencing in juvenile courts where rehabilitative 
aims are statutorily preferred and are likely to produce more disparate outcomes. 
 9.  See BRIAN J. PRESTON & HUGH DONNELLY, JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., RESEARCH 
MONOGRAPH NO. 32, ACHIEVING CONSISTENCY AND TRANSPARENCY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
OFFENCES 218 (2008). 
 10.  R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252, 276 (“[A] broad sentencing discretion is essential to 
ensur[ing] that all of the wide variations of circumstances . . . are taken into account.”). 
 11.  Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665, 672; R v MacNeil-Brown (2008) 20 VR 677, 681. 
 12.  Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR at 276. 
 13.  DPP (Vic) v Arney [2007] VSCA 126, (Unreported, 12 Jun. 2007) ¶ 14. 
 14.  See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 153. (“Individualized justice can be 
attained only if a judicial officer possesses a broad sentencing discretion . . . .”). 
 15.  George Zdenkowski, Limiting Sentencing Discretion: Has There Been a Paradigm Shift?, 12 
CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 58, 59 (2000). 
 16.  See Kable v DPP (NSW) (1995) 36 NSWLR 374, 394 (“If justice is not individual, it is 
nothing.”).  
 17.  Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra note 3. 
 18.  Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665, 672. 
 19.  AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 153. 
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wide”20 within the parameters of the maximum penalty, the limiting principle of 
proportionality, and any (rare) statutory constraints;21 
 Although there may be a range of appropriate sentences, there is no single correct 
sentence;22 
 Although there might be recurring features,23 no two cases are exactly alike;24 
 While statements by appellate courts of principles affecting sentencing discretion 
can constitute precedents, sentences themselves are not precedents;25 
 A certain level of inconsistency is acceptable and inevitable.26 
This paradigm can be divisive because it tends to regard consistency as a 
threat to the exercise of discretion. Rather than identifying the contribution 
that each paradigm can make toward fair sentencing, Australian authorities 
often view individualism and comparativism as incompatible paradigms.27 
The High Court of Australia28 has determined that the proper methodology 
for arriving at an appropriate sentence is an “instinctive” or “intuitive” 
synthesis29—an exercise in which all relevant considerations are simultaneously 
unified, balanced, and weighed by the sentencing judge.30 A judge may have 
recourse to a number of guides, but the most important is the judge’s own 
intuition regarding the factors pertaining to the instant offense and offender. 
Because the confluence of these factors is said to be “unique”31 to each case, 
 
 20.  House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 503 (Austl). 
 21.  GERARD BRENNAN, NAT’L JUD. COLL. OF AUSTL., THE HIGH COURT AND THE 
SENTENCING ENVIRONMENT 1, 3 (2006). 
 22.  Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 371; Bowen v The Queen [2011] VSCA 67, 
(Unreported, 11 Mar. 2011) ¶ 73. 
 23.  R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 287 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
 24.  CW v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 45, (Unreported, 22 Mar. 2011) ¶ 131. See Jenkins v The 
Queen (2004) 211 ALR 116, 122 (“The circumstances of cases are infinitely various.”); Western 
Australia v Akizuki (2008) 192 A Crim R 373, 388 (stating that the circumstances of sexual offenses and 
offenders “are almost infinitely variable”). On the difficulties, and undesirability, of identifying 
“objective offence seriousness” without taking into account “subjective” or personal factors, see 
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120. 
 25.  Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 544–45; Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 605; 
Bowen [2011] VSCA 67 at ¶ 73. In a Practice Note issued by the Victorian Court of Appeal in 
November 2011, the Court stated that when it considered that the reasons for decision contained no 
new point of principle, that fact would be noted with the consequence that that decision cannot be cited 
in a subsequent case without leave of the court. SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, PRACTICE NOTE 8 OF 
2011: DECISIONS MARKED “NO POINT OF PRINCIPLE” NOT TO BE CITED WITHOUT LEAVE (2012), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/resources/52f3c924-2dfb-48d7-9b0d-ff9a386c6b6d/ 
updated_pnote_8_of_2011.pdf. 
 26.  Wong (2001) 207 CLR at 591. 
 27.  Hudson v The Queen [2010] VSCA, (Unreported, 9 Dec. 2010) ¶¶ 31–33 (undertaking 
comparative analysis to identify a sentence in a similar case introduces unacceptable mathematical 
precision to the instinctive synthesis). 
 28.  The High Court is the final court of appeal for all cases, civil or criminal, state or federal.  
 29.  Wong (2001) 207 CLR at 622; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 374; Hili v The 
Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 539. 
 30.  First enunciated in this form by the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Williscroft [1975] VR 
292, 301. 
 31.  Russell v The Queen (2011) 212 A Crim R 57, 69 . 
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determining their relative weight and translating that weight into a sentence 
must be similarly unique. Sentencing is, therefore, more “art than science.”32 
A necessary consequence of this approach is that the use of “scientific 
methods”—that is, objective, replicable measurement techniques—is eschewed 
in Australian sentencing. “[M]athematical precision”33 is described as inimical 
to the instinctive synthesis. Further, instinctive synthesis is theoretically 
incompatible with sentencing “tariffs,”34 ranges,35 case comparison,36 or “starting 
points,” other than where they might play a role in “informing” the instinctive 
synthesis37 or assisting a court in determining which instance of an offense is 
more serious than another.38 To give these considerations more emphasis would 
be to “sentence the person for another crime.”39 Consequently, it has become 
accepted as an article of faith that “[t]he method of instinctive synthesis will by 
definition produce outcomes upon which reasonable minds will differ.”40 
Another consequence of this methodology is that it conceals, and possibly 
normalizes, disparity. The latitude given to judges to balance all “unique”41 
considerations means that sentences are “subjective judgment[s,] largely 
intuitively reached.”42 Consequently, the reasoning process—specifically, the 
weight attributed to determinative factors—is not always explicated.43 This 
affects the ability to assess empirically whether patterns of offense and offender 
are routinely treated in the same way. Because there can be no “correct” 
sentence in any particular case,44 sentences can be inconsistent within a 
(potentially vast) margin of error yet still legal.45 
B.  The Comparativist Approach 
Despite the dominance of the individualist approach, Australian authorities 
have recognized, at least at the level of principle, the importance of consistency 
 
 32.  KATJA FRANKO AAS, SENTENCING IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION: FROM FAUST TO 
MACINTOSH 24–26 (2005). 
 33.  Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 207–08. See also Markarian v The Queen 
(2005)  228 CLR 357, 386. 
 34.  DPP (Vic) v OJA (2007) 172 A Crim R 181, 195. 
 35.  See Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611–12; AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 111, 
121–22, 156. 
 36.  See DPP (Vic) v Terrick (2009) 24 VR 457, 475. 
 37.  FD v The Queen [2011] VSCA 8, (Unreported, 20 Jan. 2011) ¶ 34; DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa 
(2010) 243 FLR 28, 97, 99. 
 38.  DPP (Vic) v OJA (2007) 172 A Crim R at 201–02. See also Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra note 
3, at 74–75. 
 39.  AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR at 121. 
 40.  Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 206.  
 41.  Russell v The Queen (2011) 212 A Crim R 57, 69.  
 42.  R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292, 300. 
 43.  See Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 403–04 (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Markarian (2005) 228 CLR at 371; Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606, 612  
 45.  See Roger Douglas, Does the Magistrate Matter? Sentencers and Sentence in the Victorian 
Magistrates’ Courts, 22 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 40, 50 (1989). 
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as a guiding value.46 Sentencing should not be a “multiplicity of unconnected 
single instances,”47 and it has been suggested that unjustified inconsistency is 
contrary to the rule that like cases be treated alike.48 A frequently cited High 
Court judgment states that, 
[j]ust as consistency in punishment—a reflection of the notion of equal justice—is a 
fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so 
inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and 
unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public 
confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. It is for this reason that the 
avoidance and elimination of unjustifiable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of 
abiding importance to the administration of justice and to the community.
49
 
This is also reflected by sentencing legislation in most jurisdictions that aims 
“to promote consistency of approach in the sentencing of offenders.”50 
III 
CONSISTENCY 
There is no universally accepted definition of consistency in sentencing. The general 
concept is clear, however: similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar 
circumstances would be expected to receive similar sentencing outcomes.
51
 
Consistency in sentencing takes many forms. It is generally understood to 
require courts to “apply the same purposes and principles of sentencing, and to 
consider the same types of factors when sentencing.”52 Relevant to these issues 
is the manner in which judges approach and weigh legally relevant factors (such 
as those that relate to the offense or offender culpability), and the degree to 
which they are, consciously or otherwise, improperly influenced by extra-legal 
factors (such as the defendant’s race or gender). 
In relation to co-offenders, consistency refers to parity between their 
sentences. The challenge is identifying the grounds of difference between cases 
and assigning appropriate weight to these differences.53 
A distinction is often drawn between consistency of approach and 
consistency of outcome.54  The former is a procedural mechanism that obliges a 
 
 46.  Lowe (1984) 154 CLR at 610–11. See also Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295, 301; 
Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 591. 
 47.  Wong (2001) 207 CLR at 591. 
 48.  MC v The Queen [2011] VSCA (Unreported, 14 Jan. 2011) ¶¶ 28–31; R v MacNeil-Brown 
(2008) 20 VR 677, 690. 
 49.  Lowe (1984) 154 CLR at 610–11 (Mason, J., dissenting). Justice Mason’s opinion has been 
recently described as the origin of contemporary Australian doctrine on consistency. See PRESTON & 
DONNELLY, supra note 9, at 4. Although His Honour was discussing disparity between co-offenders, 
the principle has broader application. See id.  
 50.  Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 1(a). See, e.g., Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33; Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5; Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld) s 9; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6.  
 51.  U.K. SENTENCING COUNCIL, ANALYTICAL NOTE: THE RESOURCE EFFECTS OF INCREASED 
CONSISTENCY IN SENTENCING 3.1 (2011). 
 52.  AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 152. See also Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 
CLR 520, 535–36. 
 53.  Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra note 3, at 75. 
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sentencing judge to follow a prescribed sequence of steps, or to consider 
prescribed factors in arriving at a conclusion. Within a discretionary framework, 
this approach assumes that sentences will only ever be “reasonably consistent,” 
reflecting an acceptance that there is no correct sentence but rather a range of 
correct sentences, and that this is necessary if sentences are to be consistently 
proportionate. Without consistency of approach between judges, the search for 
just sentencing outcomes becomes “at best a lottery, and at worst a myth.”55 
Consistency of outcome, on the other hand, concerns uniformity of sentence 
type or quantum. It seeks congruence with a predetermined standard derived 
from factors deemed legally relevant, with such factors having been allocated a 
range of predetermined weights by persons or bodies other than the sentencing 
judge. This type of consistency may be achieved through statistical grids of the 
type employed by the U.S. federal courts or mandatory sentencing schemes. It 
embodies assumptions regarding correct sentences for cases that are relevantly 
similar, which, in turn, requires agreement about the correct identification and 
weighting of relevant factors. The historical context, and implementation of 
measures aimed at promoting consistency of outcome indicate that they may 
have been directed toward increasing the severity of sentences rather than 
increasing the fairness of sentences.56 
A.  Demonstrating Unjustifiable Disparity or Parity 
Disparity—the converse of consistency—may be justifiable or unjustifiable. 
Disparity based on legally relevant differences between offenders is justifiable; 
disparity based on differences between judges is not. Similarly, sentencing 
outcomes that are identical but which ignore legally relevant differences are 
unjustified. The Australian system is vulnerable to interjudge disparity, while 
rigid guideline or mandatory systems are vulnerable to unjustified parity.57 
Implicit in the concept of unjustified disparity is “some notion of a ‘normal’ 
sentence from which the disparate sentence varies.”58 The contention that 
unjustifiable disparity is a significant problem in Australia is not widely 
accepted by the judiciary and, when accepted, is considered a lesser evil than its 
remedies. 
 
 54.  There are other forms of consistency in the Australian framework. The term can concern the 
relationship between federal and state sentencing practices where Commonwealth and state offenses 
are heard in state courts. Consistency may also refer to same-judge disparities. See Shai Danziger, 
Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 6889 (2011).  
 55.  See R. v. Arcand (2010), 499 A.R. 1 (Can. Alta. C.A.). 
 56.  See PATRIZIA POLETTI & HUGH DONNELLY, THE JUDICIAL COMM’N OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, THE IMPACT OF THE STANDARD NON-PAROLE PERIOD SENTENCING SCHEME ON 
SENTENCING PATTERNS IN NEW SOUTH WALES 55–60 (2010); see also Doob, supra note 1, at 199, 202, 
208, 212. 
 57.  The remainder of this article will focus on the efforts to reduce unwarranted inter-judge 
disparity. 
 58.  Cyrus Tata & Neil Hutton, What Rules in Sentencing? Consistency and Disparity in the 
Absence of Rules, 26  INT’L J. SOC. L. 339, 354 (1998). 
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1.  Methodological Issues 
There are various ways of measuring unjustified disparity. The first method 
involves simulation exercises in which judges provide sentences based on 
common sets of facts. The second method involves analyzing cases with similar 
observable characteristics, and attributing residual variation in outcomes to 
judges.59 This can be done statistically or by qualitative case comparison. The 
third method is to deem random caseloads assigned to judges as comparable, 
allowing average sentencing outcomes to be compared and differences to be 
attributed to judges.60 
2.  Empirical Problems 
Although a number of studies have been conducted that appear to 
demonstrate the existence of various forms of disparity,61 there is a dearth of 
conclusive empirical evidence62 of the nature and extent of unjustified disparity 
in Australia.63 This is due partly to the difficulty of conceptualizing and 
operationalizing the notion of “unjustified disparity,”64 though this is not an 
insurmountable problem,65 as the breadth of American scholarship in this area 
demonstrates. With rare exceptions,66 the Australian empirical studies 
purporting to find unjustified disparity focus only on the specific issues of 
gender67 and race—although the number of race-effects studies in Australia are 
 
 59.  See James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing 
Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 280 (1999). 
 60.  Id. at 271. 
 61.  See, e.g., AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 2, 6, 508, 511; DON 
WEATHERBURN, SENTENCE DISPARITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NSW DISTRICT CRIMINAL COURT 
(1994); Ross Homel & Jeanette A. Lawrence, Sentencer Orientation and Case Details: An Interactive 
Analysis, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509 (1992).  
 62.  See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 508. 
 63.  A problem shared, to varying extents, by other comparable common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Mona Lynch, Expanding the Empirical Picture of Federal Sentencing: An Invitation, 23 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 313 (2011); Ryan Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (2010); Jeffry T. Ulmer, Michael T. Light, John H. Kramer, Racial Disparity in the Wake of the 
Booker/Fanfan Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 1077 (2011). 
 64.  Numerous factors are relevant to the sentencing outcome, each of which could legally justify a 
different sentence for offenders convicted of the same offense. Therefore, the fact that individuals have 
been sentenced differently does not indicate unjustified disparity. Weatherburn, supra note 61, at 5.  
 65.  Social science researchers regularly control for the influence of a variety of different factors. 
See id.  
 66.  A number of studies have been conducted since 1990. See IVAN POTAS, SENTENCING 
ROBBERS IN NEW SOUTH WALES: PRINCIPLES, POLICY AND PRACTICE (1990); Jeanette A. Lawrence 
& Ross J. Homel, Sentencer and Offender Factors as Sources of Discrimination in Magistrates’ Penalties 
for Drinking Drivers, 5 SOC. JUST. RES. 385 (1992); Homel & Lawrence, supra note 61; 
WEATHERBURN, supra note 61, Don Weatherburn & Bronwyn Lind, Sentence Disparity, Judge 
Shopping and Trial Court Delay, 29 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 147 (1996); PATRIZIA POLETTI & 
IVAN POTAS, SENTENCING DRUG OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES IMPOSED IN THE 
HIGHER COURTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES: 1 JANUARY 1992 TO 31 DECEMBER 1997 (1999). 
 67.  See, e.g., SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL (VIC), GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES (2010), available at http://sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/ 
files/gender_differences_in_sentencing_outcomes.pdf.  
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“sparse”68 in comparison to the number of such studies in the United States.69 
There are also studies looking at how intellectual disability70 and juvenile 
ethnicity71 affect sentencing. 
While these studies are valuable, more research is needed to answer the 
broader question of whether—and how much—unjustified disparity exists 
generally in sentencing. The studies that look at this question72 are now out of 
date,73 and many of these studies examined sentencing only in the lower courts. 
Although the bulk of sentencing occurs in lower courts, such studies do not 
include sentences for more serious offenses. Many of the studies reveal 
different sentence lengths and types for certain offenses. However, 
disentangling the different causes of variation is a fraught task, and it is 
probably fair to say that the extent and nature of inconsistency in sentencing in 
Australia is not well understood.74 
IV 
MECHANISMS TO PROMOTE CONSISTENCY 
Due to persistent criticisms of unjustified disparity,75 a number of 
mechanisms to achieve consistency have been introduced in the Australian 
jurisdictions.76 These differ in their approach to the task, and in the extent to 
which they constrain judicial discretion.77 These mechanisms, singly and in 
combination, have evoked significant scholarly and political debate about the 
proper value and scope of discretion in a fair sentencing system. 
 
 68.  Besides being fewer, such studies appear less methodologically sophisticated. See Samantha 
Jeffries & Christine Bond, Does Indigeneity Matter? Sentencing Indigenous Offenders in South 
Australia's Higher Courts, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 47, 49 (2009) (noting regression 
techniques used only recently in Australia to explore the effect of indigenous status on sentence).  
 69.  See, e.g., Lucy Snowball & Don Weatherburn, Does Racial Bias in Sentencing Contribute to 
Indigenous Overrepresentation in Prison?, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 272, 275 (2007) 
(discussing research in the United States regarding sentencing disparity). 
 70.  See, e.g., Judith Cockram, Justice of Differential Treatment? Sentencing of Offenders With an 
Intellectual Disability, 30 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 3 (2005). 
 71.  See, e.g., PATRICIA GALLAGHER & PATRIZIA POLETTI, SENTENCING DISPARITY AND THE 
ETHNICITY OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS (Helen Cunningham ed., 1998). 
 72.  E.g., WEATHERBURN, supra note 61; Weatherburn & Lind, supra note 66, at 147–65.  
 73.  A possible exception is SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCING OF SERIOUS 
VIOLENT OFFENCES AND SEXUAL OFFENCES IN QUEENSLAND (2011), which found no indication of a 
systemic problem with consistency in Queensland but noted that further research is needed to obtain 
better measures of consistency. 
 74. A problem shared in comparable jurisdictions, see U.K. SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 51, 
at 1.3 (The extent and “nature of inconsistency in sentencing is not understood in great detail.”). 
 75.  And, in some cases, consistent criticisms of perceived leniency. 
 76.  The size of the jurisdiction affects the operation of, and necessity for, these mechanisms. In 
relation to intrastate variations, smaller states with fewer judges are likely to develop an informal 
culture based on physical proximity which contributes to consistency. In larger states the role of formal 
mechanisms in promoting consistency is heightened. 
 77.  WEATHERBURN, supra note 61, at 16. 
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A.  Appellate Review 
The breadth of the sentencing discretion is theoretically counterbalanced by 
appellate review, a process that can promote consistency in two ways: first, as a 
check on individual sentences in lower courts; and second, as a means of 
correcting the course of sentencing practices by providing guidance to 
sentencing judges via statements of policy or principle. However, the ability of 
appellate review to fulfill both purposes has been significantly hindered by self-
imposed limitations that privilege individualism over comparativism, and thus 
consistency in sentencing.78 
In Australian sentencing, “consistency is sought to be attained largely 
through the unifying effect of appellate review”79 through the court hierarchies, 
beginning with state courts of appeal and culminating in the High Court of 
Australia. The reality, however, has been that “since their inception, [courts of 
criminal appeal] have adopted a very conservative stance” to guiding 
sentencers.80 This has limited what was intended to function as the major check 
on broad discretion. 
By statute, both defense and prosecution have the right to appeal 
sentences.81 Appellate courts have developed an extensive sentencing 
jurisprudence, as well as principles to guide appellate intervention. While 
appeal of less-serious sentences is de novo, higher sentencing courts have the 
final say on findings of fact and are given a “wide measure of latitude” by 
appellate courts, which will overturn sentences only where there is evidence of 
legal error.82 Otherwise, they will not substitute their discretion for that of the 
sentencing judge. There are two basic types of error. 83 The first type is specific, 
or legal, error—for example, acting on an erroneous principle of law or 
considering irrelevant matters.84 The second, and more common, type of error is 
for non-specific error, occurring when sentences are “manifestly excessive” or 
“manifestly inadequate” despite no apparent error in the reasons for sentence.85 
 
 78.  There are many reasons why appellate review alone is inadequate for providing guidance, 
including the limited range of cases and the lack of resources to consider thoroughly a wide range of 
matters. 
 79.  RICHARD G. FOX & ARIE FREIBERG, SENTENCING: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN VICTORIA 
31–33 (Trischa Baker ed., 2d ed. 1999). See Michael Kirby, Sentencing Reform: Help in the Most Painful 
and Unrewarding of Judicial Tasks, 54 AUSTL. L.J. 732, 741 (1980). 
 80.  Richard G. Fox, Controlling Sentencers, 20 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 218, 226 (1987). 
See Andrew Ashworth, Techniques of Guidance on Sentencing, CRIM. L. REV. 519, 528 (1984). 
 81.  FOX & FREIBERG, supra note 79, at 13.101. GEORGIA BRIGNELL & HUGH DONNELLY, JUD. 
COMM’N OF N.S.W., CROWN APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE (2005), available at http://www. 
judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/research-monographs-1/monograph27/mono27.pdf/at_download/file.  
 82.  House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504–05. See also VICTORIAN PARLIAMENT LAW 
REFORM COMM., DE NOVO APPEALS TO THE COUNTY COURT 7–9 (2006), available at 
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/.archive/lawreform/inquiries/County%20Court%20Appeals/final%20
report.pdf. 
 83.  Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Manifest Error: Grounds for Review?, 36(1) AUSTL. B. 
REV. 54, 56–57 (2012). 
 84.  See R v Taylor [1958] VR 285, 289. 
 85.  See Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 605; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321, 
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Here, error will be inferred only if the sentence is outside the appropriate 
range, assessed primarily in terms of the case before the court, not in relation to 
other cases. The original sentence must be obviously86 or egregiously87 outside 
the range. Appellate courts therefore give sentencing courts a “wide measure of 
latitude.”88 
This latitude is reinforced by the determination of Australian appellate 
courts that consistency is not “numerical equivalence,”89 but rather “consistency 
in the application of the relevant legal principles,” which is not capable of 
“mathematical precision.”90 However, scrutiny of the application of those 
principles is hampered by the “instinctive synthesis” methodology and the 
prohibition on its alternative, termed “two-stage sentencing”—sentencing based 
on a “notion of a mathematical norm,” above or below which a sentence might 
be adjusted based upon aggravating and mitigating factors.91 Consequently, the 
reasoning process underlying the initial sentence follows a largely inscrutable 
“instinctive reaction,”92 manifested in statements that “it is an unwarranted 
assumption that all of the relevant factors which bore upon the imposition of . . . 
sentences can be identified and weighted.”93 By limiting the role of external 
comparators like ranges and comparable cases, and by supporting a fairly 
opaque reasoning process, appellate courts have limited their ability to ensure 
consistency. 
An individualist approach inhibits the provision of authoritative guidance to 
sentencing courts because it holds that the primary role of an appellate court is 
to rectify error in a particular case, not lay down explicit principles.94 In 
contrast, a comparativist view promotes a public policy role for the court in 
ensuring appropriate consistency in sentences imposed within that jurisdiction.95 
The dominant understanding of individualism has resulted in appellate courts 
generally declining the task of overtly setting standards. They usually do so only 
by identifying whether a particular sentence was manifestly inadequate or 
excessive, leaving sentencing courts to infer an appropriate sentence from their 
(often limited) discussion of the matter or from previous appellate cases which 
indicate, in the (ostensibly) infinite variety of circumstances, which possibly 
relevant sentences were or were not appropriate.96 
 
325. 
 86.  Hanks v The Queen [2011] VSCA 7 (Unreported, 19 Jan. 2011) ¶ 22. 
 87.  DPP (Vic) v Oversby [2004] VSCA 208 (Unreported, 18 Nov. 2004). 
 88.  See Russell v The Queen (2011) 212 A Crim R 57, 68. 
 89.  Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 526. 
 90.  Hudson (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 207. 
 91.  AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 111, 120–22; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 
377–80.  
 92.  DPP (Vic) v Terrick (2009) 24 VR 457, 475. 
 93.  Hudson (2010) 205 A Crim R at 207.  
 94.  FOX & FREIBERG, supra note 79, at 1053–54.  
 95.  See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 513; Ashworth, supra note 80, at 525. 
 96.  See, e.g., Police (SA) v Cadd (1997) 69 SASR 150, 165; Kovacevic v Mills (2000) 76 SASR 404 
(noting the undesirability of courts setting sentencing standards). 
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A comparativist approach to appellate intervention would, by contrast, 
identify ranges for various categories of offenses and types of offenders in 
various sets of typical circumstances. It would also identify a way of 
approaching and weighing these circumstances, providing needed assurance 
that relevant factors would be routinely approached—and would be seen as 
approached—in a consistent manner. This would honor the fact that one of the 
major functions of a court of criminal appeal is to achieve consistency and 
certainty by “minimizing disparities of sentencing standards, while leaving a fair 
margin of discretion to sentencing judges.”97 Instead, there has been a general 
disinclination by appellate courts to resolve the majority of questions, except to 
say that there “are no golden rules.”98 
B.  Provision of Sentencing Information to Primary Judges 
Another mechanism to promote consistency in the individualized Australian 
framework is the provision of sentencing information. This assists judges by 
placing at their disposal “the collective experience of the judiciary,”99 in the 
hope that consistency is just a question of “better informing the sentencing 
discretion.”100 Information takes various forms—including ranges, statistics, 
comparable cases and databases—each of which indicates “current sentencing 
practices” and gives judges the “means to ascertain whether the manner in 
which he or she sentenced was consistent with that of other judges for similarly 
situated offenders.”101 Understandably, judges usually want to know what other 
judges have done in similar cases, and do not set out to impose disparate views 
of sentencing policy.102 However, this approach is largely voluntary and judges 
are not obligated to use the information in any particular way, or to use it at all. 
There are three major methods of providing information to sentencing 
judges: sentencing ranges, sentencing statistics, and sentencing information 
databases. 
1.  Sentencing Ranges 
The High Court of Australia has stated that there is no single correct 
sentence, but rather a range of permissible sentences.103 The concept of “range” 
 
 97.  R v Allinson (1987) 49 NTR 38, 39 (Sup. Ct. N.T.); see also R v Green [1986] 2 Qd R 406, 410. 
 98.  R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 554, 555 (N.S.W. Ct. Crim. App.). 
 99.  Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 591; R v Bangard (2005) 13 VR 146, 148.  
 100.  Geraldine Mackenzie, Achieving Consistency in Sentencing: Moving to Best Practice?, 22 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 74, 78 (2002). 
 101.  John C. Richter, Déjà Vu All Over Again: How Post-Booker Sentencing Threatens Equal 
Justice Under the Law, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 340, 340 (2008). 
 102.  See Gerard Lynch, Sentencing: Learning from, And Worrying About, The States, 105 COLUM.. 
L. REV. 933, 940 (2005); Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing 
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 
1370 (2005). 
 103.  Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606, 612; Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610, 624; 
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 371. 
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implies scope for discretion, but also that this scope is not unlimited.104 A 
“range” is generally regarded as an “historical fact”105 that may broadly identify 
a sentencing “overview” or “trend”106 and therefore assist a court in imposing a 
sentence that is more likely to be consistent with similar cases. Sentence ranges 
may be provided by the defense, the prosecution, or developed by the courts 
themselves. For some judges this goes too far in restricting discretion. They 
have rejected such a concept, arguing that the intuitive synthesis approach 
“implies an absence of a necessary relationship between one case and 
another.”107 For judges who accept the concept of range, albeit with reservation, 
it can serve as a “yardstick”108 against which proposed sentences may be 
examined.109 However, a sentencing judge who refers to the range as a “starting 
point” or “benchmark” sentence must take care not to employ a “two-stage” 
reasoning process which is inimical to the instinctive synthesis methodology and 
thus fall into appealable error.110 This is because it is “wrong in principle” to 
start anywhere except with a full consideration of all relevant factors in a 
particular case.111 To elevate only certain considerations or factors, like the 
range of comparable sentences, is regarded as distorting the reasoning 
process.112 
2.  Sentencing Statistics 
In relation to sentencing, statistics may provide indications of general 
trends.113 They can provide a quantitative aspect to inform the qualitative 
aspects of case comparison, helping to ensure consistency in the instant case. 
However, they are generally treated with reserve and the courts have hedged 
their use by numerous caveats relating to the nature of the offense under 
consideration, sample size, counting rules, and others.114 Statistics have also 
been criticized because they can never provide information about the particular 
reasons for judgment in a particular case.115 
The underlying antipathy to social science data in the courts has limited 
their utility in identifying patterns of sentencing in commonly occurring crimes 
 
 104.  DPP (Vic) v Terrick (2009) 24 VR 457, 475. 
 105.  R v Lawson (1997) 142 FLR 323, 324.  
 106.  Spiteri v The Queen (2011) 206 A Crim R 528, 539. 
 107.  DPP (Vic) v OJA (2007) 172 A Crim R 181, 195.  
 108.  DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 243 FLR 28, 98; R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168, 192. 
 109.  R v King (1988) 48 SASR 555, 557 (a sentencing standard or range is a general guide although 
it is not rigid); R v JO (2009) 24 NTLR 129, 147. 
 110.  See, for example, the warning given in R v Bartel [2008] SASC 289 (Unreported, 31 Oct. 2008) 
¶ 14. 
 111.  Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611–12.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  For further discussion of statistical resources in Australia, see Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra 
note 3. 
 114.  See Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra note 3. 
 115.  Nor do they identify individual judges. See, e.g., Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520, 535. 
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where there are sufficient cases and circumstances to permit legal conclusions 
about what is unjustifiably disparate and what is not. 
3.  Sentencing Information Systems 
Sentencing information systems or databases utilize information technology 
to store, and facilitate targeted access to, the qualitative and quantitative forms 
of information discussed above.116 The systems do not indicate how this 
information should be used, but the “availability of the information might in 
itself promote consistency.”117 Thus, databases preserve discretion by informing 
the decisionmaking process rather than determining the outcome.118 However, 
they can help avoid unjustified discrepancies if judges use the information to 
produce individualized sentences that are also consistent with outcomes in 
similar circumstances. 
Although the idea of information databases is not new,119 they have become 
an extremely efficient technological reality relatively recently. However, few 
are in operation. Databases in Canada and Scotland are no longer operating. 
Explanations for their demise have included lack of (judicial) support for the 
system.120 
New South Wales (NSW) has one of the oldest and most successful 
sentencing databases—the Judicial Information Research System (JIRS)—a 
subset of which is the Sentencing Information System (SIS). Frequently cited,121 
JIRS provides information about sentencing patterns that can be analyzed 
precisely in relation to such factors as age and prior convictions. Recently, an 
Environmental Crime Sentencing Database has also been established in NSW.122 
There are other examples of Australian sentencing information systems. In 
2007, a database modelled on JIRS was established in Queensland. The 
Commonwealth Sentencing Database provides courts exercising federal 
jurisdiction with information about current sentencing law and practices. A 
database of sentencing practices is being established in Tasmania to “support 
judicial decision making, research and policy making.”123 
Development, implementation, and access to sentencing databases in 
Australia have been ad hoc. This may, in part, be attributable to cost and 
perceived difficulty of use. There is also the potential threat to individualism 
 
 116.  See Neil Hutton, Sentencing, Rationality, and Computer Technology, 22 J. L. & SOC’Y 549, 554, 
558–59 (1995). 
 117.  Id. at 561. 
 118.  See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 11. 
 119.  See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Norman W. Park, Computerised Sentencing Information for 
Judges: An Aid to the Sentencing Process, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 54 (1987); Norval Morris, Sentencing 
Convicted Criminals, 27 AUSTL. L.J. 186, 200 (1953). 
 120.  ANTHONY DOOB, SENTENCING AIDS: FINAL REPORT (1990); Hutton, supra note 116, at 561. 
 121.  See, e.g., Blackwell v The Queen (2011) 208 A Crim R 392, at ¶ 116; Bombardieri v The Queen 
(2010) 203 A Crim R 89, at ¶ 14. 
 122.  See PRESTON & DONNELLY, supra note 9.  
 123.  Current Projects, SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL (TAS), http://www.sentencingcouncil. 
tas.gov.au /current_projects (last updated June 15, 2012).  
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that arises from the erroneous belief that the databases usurp discretion by 
providing an “answer,” when they only provide raw data. A potential threat 
also arises from a suspicion that the accessibility of raw data will reveal a record 
of sentencing practices and outcomes that may make existing disparity more 
evident. 
The provision of sentencing information to promote consistency is premised 
on the hope that disparity arises “from lack of systemic knowledge.”124 Once 
equipped with the information, judges are still free to interpret and apply it as 
they wish, and the existing research shows that they will do so “in manners 
consistent with their own schemas.”125 This context of relatively unbridled 
discretion means that the provision of such information may, on its own, be 
“inherently insufficient” to reduce unwarranted disparity.126 
C.  Judicial Training and Education 
The same underlying rationale of promoting consistency extends to the use 
of judicial training and education. Judicial education is “not a novel idea in 
Australia.”127 While there are numerous programs annually, no single agency 
carries responsibility for judicial education.128 Programs are voluntary and 
include orientation for new judges as well as specific courses for judicial 
continuing education, including sentencing workshops. The voluntary nature of 
such programs, and the fact that “[i]nterest in judicial education has been slow 
to develop in Australia” can be viewed as a symptom of the individualist 
framework, which places a premium on unfettered discretion entrusted to those 
deemed wise enough to know how to wield it.129 
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, established in 1986, is an 
independent statutory agency and part of the judicial branch. First listed among 
its functions is assisting courts in achieving consistency in sentencing—although 
it has no legislative power to do anything that could be construed as limiting 
sentencing discretion.130 To meet that objective, it “provides relevant 
information online, undertakes original research and publishes material on 
sentencing.”131 Foremost among these publications is the sentencing database132 
and the Sentencing Bench Book, a regularly updated source of sentencing 
 
 124.  See Homel & Lawrence, supra note 61, at 534. 
 125.  See id. 
 126.  See WEATHERBURN, supra note 61, at 16. 
 127.  Susan C. Kenny, Judicial Education in Australia, 13 LEGAL EDUC. DIG. 8, 8 (2004). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See Peter Underwood, Educating Judges What Do We Need? 14 LEGAL EDUC. DIG. 25, 10 
(2006).  
 130.  JUD. COMM’N OF N.S.W., http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). See 
WEATHERBURN, supra note 61, at 16. 
 131.  JUD. COMM’N OF N.S.W., Research and Sentencing, http://www.judcom.nsw.gov. au/research-
and-sentencing (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).   
 132.  See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. 
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information designed to assist judges on the ground.133 The Bench Book “serves 
one of the principal functions of the Commission—the promotion of 
consistency in sentencing.”134 Similarly, the Judicial College of Victoria, 
established in 2002, publishes the Victorian Sentencing Manual.135 Regularly 
updated, the Manual is a practical guide to sentencing intended to “promote 
consistency of approach by sentencers in the exercise of their discretion.”136 
As with sentencing information, reasonable minds can differ as to the 
efficacy of judicial education and training in reducing unjustified disparity. This 
is especially so in the absence of evaluative studies to shed light on the matter. 
D.  Presumptive and Mandatory Sentences 
Whereas appellate review and judicial information have been judicially 
generated methods of achieving consistency, presumptive and mandatory 
sentences are political responses to disparity, as well as leniency. In Australia, 
the vicissitudes of politics (rather than concerns about unjustified interjudge 
disparity) have driven the introduction of such measures. However, as these 
steps fill a policy vacuum, it is reasonable to assume that the reluctance of 
appellate courts to promote their own sentencing standards may have 
contributed towards such measures.137 
Mandatory restrictions on sentences for certain violent and sexual offenders 
exist in Victoria and Queensland.138 More prescriptive mandatory sentencing, 
however, usually takes the form of minimum sentences of imprisonment that 
escalate with each subsequent offense. The mandatory minimum periods are 
not long by international standards (between fourteen days and one year), and 
where they are or were in operation, they did not appreciably add to the prison 
population due to their brevity and infrequent use.139 At the federal level, 
certain forms of the offense of people smuggling require a court to impose a 
sentence of  either imprisonment of at least five years (with a minimum non-
parole period of three years) or eight years (with a minimum non-parole period 
of five years).140 
In 2003, presumptive sentences for certain offenses were introduced in New 
South Wales in the form of standard non-parole periods (SNPPs).141 This was 
 
 133.  JUD. COMM’N OF N.S.W., EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: BENCH BOOK iii (2006) 
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sentencing/foreword.html (last updated April 
2011). 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  See JUDICIAL COLL. VICTORIA, VICTORIAN SENTENCING MANUAL, http://www.judicial 
college.vic.edu.au/publications/victorian-sentencing-manual (last updated Dec. 11 2012). 
 136.  Id. (Introduction). 
 137.  Freiberg & Krasnostein, supra note 3, at 91. 
 138.  See, e.g., Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 401; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) pt 9A; 
Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA). Less restrictive jurisdictions do not make these regimes mandatory. See, 
e.g., Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) div 3; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 20B. 
 139.  Freiberg, supra note 7, at 207.  
 140.  See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 236B. 
 141.  See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 54A–B; Kate Warner, Sentencing Review 
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the first Australian jurisdiction to enact a defined term SNPP scheme, a form of 
legislative guidance geared toward increasing the consistency—and severity—of 
sentences. In most Australian jurisdictions, a sentence of imprisonment has two 
main components: the “head” or maximum term (the period beyond which a 
person cannot be held in custody), and a minimum (the non-parole period, 
prior to which the person is not eligible for parole consideration).142 The period 
between the head sentence and the non–parole period is the parole period. 
SNPPs were never mandatory, as courts could depart from them in cases 
outside the middle range of seriousness or where relevant factors were 
present.143 The High Court, however, recently held that SNPPs are not even 
presumptive and that the appropriate place to start in formulating a sentence 
remains the instinctive synthesis method, requiring courts to “take into account 
the full range of factors in determining the appropriate sentence for the 
offence.”144 Among the various factors, courts may consider the maximum 
penalty and the SNPP as “two legislative guideposts.”145 However, the SNPPs 
were only “a circumstance” that said little about the appropriate sentence for a 
particular case. 
Three other Australian jurisdictions have a form of SNPP scheme—South 
Australia, Northern Territory, and Tasmania. Two others, Queensland and 
Victoria, have foreshadowed the introduction of forms of SNPPs or baseline 
sentences, though both appear to be concerned more with perceptions of 
leniency than disparity.146 
E.  Guideline Judgments 
Guideline judgments of the type common in the United Kingdom147—albeit 
created by appellate courts rather than a commission or council—were another 
mechanism introduced in Australia to achieve consistency. Guideline judgments 
attempt to do so by structuring sentencing discretion. This can occur in a 
number of ways. Using the example of the case before the court, a guideline 
judgment can articulate sentencing principles, identify broadly relevant 
mitigating or aggravating factors, discuss the relevance of different sanctions to 
an offense or provide relevant ranges. Nonbinding guideline judgments 
 
2010–11, 35 CRIM. L.J. 284, 285 (2011). 
 142.  Parole is generally not available in relation to shorter sentences—for example, those under 
one year. 
 143.  See R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168, 184, overruled by Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 
120, 131. 
 144.  Muldrock (2011) 244 CLR 120, 132. The decision may have the same effect as the Booker 
decision in relation to sentencing guidelines in the United States, but for different reasons. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See GERALDINE MACKENZIE, QUEENSLAND SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MINIMUM 
STANDARD NON-PAROLE PERIODS: FINAL REPORT (2011); NARELLE SULLIVAN & DONALD 
RITCHIE, VICTORIA SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, BASELINE SENTENCING REPORT (2012). 
 147.  See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32, 37 (5th ed., 2010). 
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promote consistency while preserving judicial discretion. These functions are 
now, however, mostly academic in Australia. 
Guideline judgments had a brief and unspectacular life before being 
rendered effectively moot by the High Court.148 In Australia, as in the United 
Kingdom, no statutory foundation was needed for this power—courts of appeal 
were always able to develop guidelines as they deemed them necessary and 
appropriate. However, a number of jurisdictions statutorily authorized their 
use.149 In 1998, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal began issuing 
guideline judgments to improve consistency in sentencing.150 The court delivered 
seven such guideline judgments, each a “mechanism for structuring discretion, 
rather than restricting discretion.”151 However, this was seen as a move too far 
down the path of comparativism. The High Court held that prospective 
guideline judgment might be unconstitutional because courts cannot generally 
deal with points of law that may not be the subject of a dispute.152 Some 
members were also concerned that a guideline, which identifies a range of 
results rather than a reasoning process, passes from the judicial to the 
legislative.153 
One member of the majority noted that in issuing the guideline judgment, 
the court 
was clearly motivated by the laudable aim of removing the badge of unfairness 
(inconsistency), so far as that was possible and consistent with evaluative decisions 
made by judicial officers . . . . The purpose of ‘guideline judgments’ is to replace 
informal, private and unrevealed judicial means of ensuring consistency in sentencing 
with a publicly declared standard.”
154
  
Despite critical remarks about guidelines in the majority decision, there was 
some support for guideline judgments in an appropriate case.155 The risks of 
wrongly identifying such a case have, however, effectively ended that form of 
judicial guidance. 
F.  Statutory Frameworks 
Another mechanism for achieving consistency is sentencing legislation. 
Generally, these frameworks are the result of policy projects, and are therefore 
different from the “knee-jerk” legislative responses that produce mandatory or 
presumptive sentences. However, the frameworks have been subject to ad hoc 
 
 148.  See Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584.  
 149.  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 36–42A; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 143; 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) pt 2AA; Criminal Law (Sentencing Act) 1988 (SA) s 29A. 
 150.  The first guideline judgment concerned the offense of dangerous driving occasioning bodily 
harm. Other guidelines have dealt with armed robbery, drug trafficking, breaking and entering, and 
guilty pleas. See Mackenzie, supra note 100, 85–89. 
 151.  R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209, 221. 
 152.  Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 615, 632. See also Arie Freiberg & Peter Sallmann, 
Court of Appeal and Sentencing: Principles, Policy and Politics, 26 L. CONTEXT 43, 66 (2009). 
 153.  Wong (2001) 207 CLR at 619. 
 154.  Id. at 618. 
 155.  Mackenzie, supra note 100, at 88. See Wong (2001) 207 CLR at 644. 
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amendment as a result of these same electoral pressures, and are vulnerable to 
similar criticisms as mandatory or presumptive sentences. 
Since the 1980s, all Australian jurisdictions have attempted to provide the 
courts with a coherent legislative sentencing framework.156 These laws are not 
rigid codes, but provide only general guidance to courts through broad 
sentencing principles, purposes, and a range of sentencing options—particularly 
intermediate sanctions.157 Elements of this approach are seen also in the United 
Kingdom (albeit where they exist alongside more detailed guidelines),158 
Canada,159 and New Zealand.160 
The nonprescriptive nature of these Acts, taken together with the reluctance 
of appellate courts to offer principled guidance, results in a “free-for-all” 
approach to the purposes of punishment.161 The phrase belongs to Andrew 
Ashworth, who, when discussing the rationales of sentencing in the English 
context, argued that the desire to maintain sufficient discretion to individualize 
sentences does not adequately rebut the argument for bringing the rule of law 
as far into sentencing as possible.162 Instead, the legislation reflects the case law 
that “[t]he purposes of punishment are manifold and each element will assume 
a different significance not only in different crimes but in the individual 
commission of each crime.”163 For this reason, broadly framed legislative 
schemes reinforce the high individualism of the courts. 
G.  Sentencing Councils 
The final mechanism to promote consistency is the establishment of 
sentencing councils. Four states have done so: New South Wales (established 
2003), Victoria (established 2004), Queensland (established 2010, and 
disbanded by a newly elected conservative government in 2012), and Tasmania 
(established 2010). South Australia has also announced that it plans to establish 
a sentencing council.164 These bodies have a range of functions that vary 
 
 156.  See Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999 (NSW); Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas); Sentencing Act 1995 and Sentence Administration Act 1995 
(WA); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA).  
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 142 (Eng.); Ashworth, supra note 147, at 76–78. 
 159.  Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c. C-46, 718 (Can.). 
 160.  Sentencing Act 2002, s 7 (N.Z.); see Julian V. Roberts, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors at 
Sentencing: Towards Greater Consistency of Application, 4 CRIM. L. REV. 264 (2008) (comparing the 
degree of guidance regarding statutory sentencing factors between various common law jurisdictions).  
 161.  ASHWORTH, supra note 147, at 76–78.  
 162.  Id. at 76. On the other hand, a consequence of elevating one purpose, such as desert or 
retribution, may be unjust parity. A single or dominant purpose may also reduce the opportunity to 
innovate with such as procedures as restorative justice or problem-oriented courts such as drug courts. 
 163.  R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292, 299–300. 
 164.  South Austl. Att’y Gen. Dep’t, Call for Expressions of Interest for Membership to the 
Sentencing Council of South Australia, ATT’Y GEN. DEPARTMENT (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.agd.sa.gov.au/newsroom/news/news-archive/2011-news-archive (accessed by searching for 
sentencing council in the news archive). 
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between states, but usually include promoting consistency through the creation, 
collection, and dissemination of data.165 In Australia, the councils promote 
public confidence in the sentencing system by informing and engaging the 
public in the development of sentencing policy. 
Sentencing councils also conduct specialized research used by both the 
government and the courts. Each council is concerned with improving the 
quality and dissemination of sentencing information. For example, the 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council provides information in the form of 
“Sentencing Snapshots,” which are brief statistical summaries of sentencing 
practices for the most commonly heard offenses. As of June 2011, 113 
Snapshots have been published, which have been cited over 100 times by the 
Court of Appeal.166 The Council also publishes a series on current sentencing 
practices for individual offenses.167 By generating and promoting access to 
empirical data, each council is implicitly concerned with promoting a 
comparativist approach to sentencing. 
V 
EVALUATING SUCCESS 
Each of these mechanisms has been relied on to reduce the conscious or 
unconscious use of broad judicial discretion in a manner that produces 
unjustified disparity. But if the evidence of the extent of unjustified disparity is 
limited, then that for determining the success of the various mechanisms 
employed for reducing it is negligible. The sentencing literature is replete with 
material articulating the reasons for, and descriptions of the means to achieve 
consistency.168 But whether for methodological, financial, or political reasons, 
the evaluative literature is, for the most part, lacking. 
The exceptions are evaluations, all conducted by the Judicial Commission of 
New South Wales (NSW), of the impact in the state of NSW of guideline 
judgments and SNPPs. The few evaluations of guideline judgments demonstrate 
that during their short life they successfully achieved greater consistency.169 
 
 165.  See AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, ISSUES PAPER 29: SENTENCING OF FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS  201 (2005). 
 166.  There are no data as to how often they are cited by sentencing judges and how they have been 
used. 
 167.  See, e.g., FELICITY STEWART & GEOFF FISHER, VICTORIA SENTENCING ADVISORY 
COUNCIL, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY: CURRENT SENTENCING PRACTICES (2011), available at 
https://sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/files/aggravated_burglary_curren
t_sentencing_practices_0.pdf. 
 168.  For example, a 2005 inquiry into promoting consistency stated that “the main issue is how 
sentencing consistency could be better promoted, and as such it is not necessary to determine the extent 
to which sentencing is actually inconsistent, but only to identify impediments to consistency which 
currently exist and how consistency could be better promoted.” N.S.W. SENTENCING COUNCIL, HOW 
BEST TO PROMOTE CONSISTENCY IN THE LOCAL COURT 23 (2005). 
 169.  See LYNNE A. BARNES & PATRIZIA POLETTI, SENTENCING ROBBERY OFFENDERS SINCE 
THE HENRY GUIDELINE JUDGMENT (Angela Damis & Rowena Johns eds., 2007); LYNNE A. BARNES, 
PATRIZIA POLETTI & IVAN POTAS, SENTENCING DANGEROUS DRIVERS IN NEW SOUTH WALES: 
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Studies in 2002 and 2003 evidenced increased consistency in sentences for 
dangerous driving and armed robbery,170 respectively. The 2002 study assessed 
whether the dangerous driving guideline had reached its goals of correcting “an 
unacceptable level of inconsistency in the sentences” and raising sentences to 
reflect community expectations.171 By comparing sentencing patterns for cases 
decided three years before and three years after the guidelines were 
promulgated, the study found “greater consistency of result in the sentences” 
after the guideline judgment as well as “a clear and discernible increase in the 
severity of penalties.”172 
The  2003 exploratory study of the impact of the guideline judgment for 
robbery found that it had increased the consistency and severity of relevant 
sentences.173 This was confirmed by a larger study in 2007.174 
The last evaluative study of the effectiveness of guideline judgments in 
promoting consistency was a 2005 analysis of the impact of the guideline on the 
driving offense of high-range prescribed concentration of alcohol (PCA). 
Analyzing sentencing patterns for the offense before and after the guideline, it 
found that the guideline, “together with the research and educational programs 
leading up to it,” increased sentence severity and consistency for high-range 
PCA offenses.175 
These evaluations showed that the guideline judgments successfully 
responded to informed public opinion regarding the need to increase severity 
and consistency of sentencing for certain offenses. The mechanism is now 
effectively defunct, however, as the High Court has confirmed that the 
Australian emphasis on individualization represents not only an inherent 
mistrust of United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines176 and Minnesota-type 
guidelines, but a suspicion of English-style guidelines—and, in fact, guidelines 
of any type.177 This is because, broadly speaking, the only “starting point” 
should be all the particular circumstances of the case before the court. To begin 
elsewhere—for example, with the presumption of a certain range—is to ignore 
 
IMPACT OF THE JURISIC GUIDELINES ON SENTENCING PRACTICE (2002); Lynne A. Barnes & Patrizia 
Poletti, Sentencing Trends for Armed Robbery and Robbery in Company: The Impact of the Guideline 
in R v Henry, 26 SENT’G TRENDS & ISSUES 1, 11 (2003); Patrizia Poletti, Impact of The High Range 
PCA Guideline Judgment on Sentencing Drink Drivers in New South Wales, 35 SENT’G TRENDS & 
ISSUES 1 (2005). All of these reports were published by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales. 
 170.  BARNES, POLETTI & POTAS, supra note 169; BARNES & POLETTI, supra note 169, at 11. 
 171.  BARNES, POLETTI & POTAS, supra note 169 at summary. See also R v Jurisic (1998) 45 
NSWLR 209. 
 172.  BARNES, POLETTI & POTAS, supra note 169 summary. 
 173.  BARNES & POLETTI, supra note 169. 
 174.  Id. at 148.  
 175.  Poletti, supra note 169, at 18. 
 176.  Introduced for the purpose, inter alia, of “avoiding unwarranted disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of criminal conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). See Ulmer, 
Light & Kramer, supra note 63.  
 177.  Freiberg, supra note 7, at 210. 
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the proper “instinctive synthesis” in a way that “distorts the already difficult 
balancing exercise which the judge must perform.”178 
The only other evaluative study of a mechanism introduced to promote 
consistency concerned SNPPs.179 Comparing nearly five years of SNPP 
sentencing data to data from before SNPPs were introduced, it found that the 
scheme “generally resulted in a greater uniformity of, and consistency in, 
sentencing outcomes,”180 and confirmed increased severity.181 Importantly, 
however, it found that “it is not possible to conclude that the statutory scheme 
has only resulted in a benign form of consistency or uniformity whereby like 
cases are being treated alike and dissimilar cases differently . . . it is not possible 
to tell whether dissimilar cases are now being treated uniformly in order to 
comply with the statutory scheme.”182 Thus, although consistency increased 
under SNPPs, it has not been demonstrated that these sentences were 
consistently fair. 
While useful, these evaluations are of limited scope. With one exception,183 
they look broadly at consistency using aggregate data rather than specifically 
investigating the extent of unjustified disparity.184 While the former indicates the 
spread of sentences, the latter study would establish whether differences were 
justified by asking whether (a) measures of offense seriousness and (b) offender 
characteristics were being treated consistently. This further inquiry is essential 
given that variation within the permissible boundaries does not equate to  
“relevant inconsistency or impermissible disparity.”185 
The lack of research into unjustified disparity in Australia has “allowed the 
existence of unwarranted disparity to be the subject of continuing skepticism.”186 
However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.187 Data that indicate 
whether unjustified disparity exists and how successful the mechanisms for 
 
 178.  Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584, 611–12. 
 179.  See POLETTI & DONNELLY, supra note 56. This was preceded by a preliminary study 
comparing guilty plea rates for offenders sentenced before and after the SNPP was introduced. See 
Hugh Donnelly & Patrizia Poletti, Guilty Plea Rates for Offenders Sentenced Before and After the 
Standard Non-Parole Period Legislation, 19 JUD. OFFICERS BULL. 34 (2007). 
 180.  POLETTI & DONNELLY, supra note 56, at 15–18, 60. 
 181.  Id. at 60. 
 182.  Id. at 60–61. 
 183.  BARNES & POLETTI, supra note 169, at 68, 149 (looking at, in addition to data on ranges,  the 
ways in which judges articulated sentencing purposes and assessed the variations in the objective and 
subjective features of the case). 
 184.  BARNES, POLETTI & POTAS, supra note 169, at 14 (comparing sentencing patterns); Barnes & 
Poletti, supra note 169 (comparing aggregate sentencing trends only for robbery offenses); Poletti, 
supra note 169, at 4 (finding insufficient data to determine whether the offense was an example of an 
ordinary case or one where the moral culpability of an offender was increased; nevertheless, the study 
assumed that the overall nature and quality of offenses did not significantly vary between periods); 
Poletti & Donnelly, supra note 56, at 60–61 (admitting the study is inconclusive regarding whether the 
increased consistency is a product of treating dissimilar cases differently). 
 185.  Spigelman, supra note 2, at 450. 
 186.  Zdenkowski, supra note 15, at 59. 
 187.  See MARTIN REES, OUR COSMIC HABITAT  28 (2001). 
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promoting consistency have been are needed in order to ascertain whether 
sentencing in Australia is systematically fair.188 
In technical terms, the evaluative task is considerable. It first requires a way 
of determining amounts of unjustified disparity prior to the implementation of 
the measure introduced to address it. As we have attempted to demonstrate, it 
is difficult enough to measure disparity, let alone unjustified disparity. Measures 
of unjustified disparity can themselves be problematic. Early evaluative 
problems of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines were exacerbated because 
the Guidelines introduced a new model of sentencing.189 Certain assessments190 
ignored this to their detriment, using an inappropriate test of disparity that 
compared sentences before and after the Guidelines—which was like 
“comparing apples to oranges.”191 These assessments used “variation from the 
guideline” as the only measure of unjustified disparity, instead of asking 
whether similar offender characteristics were being treated similarly.192 This was 
because the Guidelines, and mandatory sentences, made such considerations 
largely moot. Any evaluation of the mechanisms introduced in Australia must 
be mindful of such problems. 
The measures of unjustified disparity can be problematic in another way. 
Many of the U.S. evaluations have been concerned with the application and 
effect of the Federal Guidelines, rather than whether the sentences handed 
down were appropriate and fair. Although both considerations are valuable, 
they are not the same. The Guidelines emphasize the primacy of offense 
characteristics and criminal history. However, in Australia, a broader range of 
contextual considerations is fundamental to notions of fair sentencing that rest 
on the belief that offense seriousness is a function of offender culpability 
determined heavily by subjective offender characteristics and the harm caused. 
Therefore, future evaluations must incorporate this qualitative data to assess 
whether disparity is justified or not. 
Evaluative studies must also be alert to the dangers of unjustified 
consistency. Consistent sentence outcomes do not necessarily indicate justified 
parity.193 Evaluations must be sensitive to this equally undesirable result. 194 
 
 188.  See Wong v The Queen (2001) CLR 584, 591; Hutton, supra note 116, at 554. 
 189.  Under the pre-Booker Guidelines, previously crucial factors pertaining to the offense and the 
offender were effectively excluded from judicial consideration. 
 190.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
REMAIN UNANSWERED (1992); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM 
IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING (1991), reprinted in 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 126 (1992). See also 
Anderson et al., supra note 59, at 271, 280; Doob, supra note 1, at 199. 
 191.  Anderson et al., supra note 59, at 271, 280; Doob, supra note 1, at 199, 234. 
 192.  Doob, supra note 1, at 199, 234–35. 
 193.  Id. at 271. 
 194.  See Anderson et al., supra note 59. 
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
Common law sentencing has always struggled to reconcile the principles of 
individualized justice and consistency. In Australia, the emphasis on 
individualism places it at one end of the spectrum. The U.S. federal experience 
of mandatory grid sentencing prior to Booker highlights the dangers of too-
strongly restricting judicial discretion. The relatively recent decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court have seen the law move closer to the center.195 Individualism 
and consistency do not present an “either–or” proposition, but are rather 
matters of degree.196 The various experiments with structured discretion around 
the common law world provide a rich source of ideas for achieving 
consistency.197 The modern challenge is not to find new ideas, but to determine 
which of the current ones are effective in doing what they purport to do. Only 
when these measures are rigorously evaluated will we know whether we have 
arrived at our destination. 
 
 
 195.  This has been seen in U.S. Supreme Court decisions re-investing federal judges with a degree 
of individualized sentencing discretion, although not to the same extent as the pre-Guidelines era. See 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Rita v United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Illustrating 
the dialectic nature of this debate, research is now divided on whether increased discretion has 
increased racial disparities in sentences. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, 
and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1496 (2008); Richter, supra note 101, at 340–42. 
 196.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 228 (2d 
ed. 2009); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A 
20 Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69 (1999).  
 197.  See Miller, supra note 102, at 1351–52 (concluding that state sentencing reform appears more 
successful, principled, popular and consistent than the U.S. federal guidelines).  
